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The "Racing" of American Society:
Race Functioning as a Verb Before
Signifying as a Noun
john a. powell*
Introduction
In Racial Identity and the State: The Dilemmas of Classifica-
tion, Michael Omi identifies several problems that frustrate efforts
to identify and understand race in a consistent and disciplined
manner.1 Omi references scientists' difficulties in confronting the
issue of race as they attempt to use their ostensibly objective ana-
lytical framework to understand a concept which has no scientific
reality, but which at the same time has a powerful social reality
and is very instrumental in shaping our individual and collective
identities. 2 Although perplexing at first blush, these difficulties in
understanding race are not as problematic as they seem when one
considers the multiplicity of truth: the reality that in one sphere-
the social-race does not'necessarily carry the same meaning as in
another sphere-the scientific or biological. In fact, even within
particular frameworks of analysis there are different paradigms of
understanding.3 Once these premises are recognized, they provide
meaningful insight into attempts to understand and address race
and racism in our society.
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tute on Race and Poverty. Professor powell would like to thank Professors David
Roediger and Anna Meigs for reading earlier drafts of this Essay and providing
insightful comments and criticism. He would also like to thank Gavin Kearney,
University of Minnesota Law School Class of 1997, for his valuable research and
hard work on this Essay.
1. Michael Omi, Racial Identity and the State: The Dilemmas of Classifica-
tion, 15 LAW & INEQ. J. 7, 14-21 (1997),
2. Id. at 21.
3. Comparing Newtonian and Einsteinian physics provides a notable example
of coexisting paradigms of understanding. See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 6 (1962) C'Each [revolution in scientific
thought] produced a consequent shift in the problems available for scientific scru-
tiny and in the standards by which the profession determined what would count as
an admissible problem or as a legitimate problem-solution.").
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Recognizing that race is not a single, unitary concept, but
rather one that mutates and adapts across socio-historical contexts
and different life-spheres, aids efforts to address racism and racial
hierarchy in our society. Although Omi focuses largely on de-
scribing race, the larger underlying objective is to understand and
address racism. If we assert that race is problematic despite its
varying manifestations, then it is clear we must focus not on race
per se (indeed, there is no "race per se"), but rather on what is
problematic about the ways in which race functions within these
different contexts. The problem is that race is often used to create
and maintain domination and hierarchy, yet how race is used to
dominate and create hierarchy varies just as race itself varies.
Recognizing the multiplicitous nature of race leads to the under-
standing that remedial efforts cannot adopt a one-dimensional
framework, but instead must be adapted to the many contexts and
manners in which race functions to dominate.
In part a reaction to Omi's comments and in part an expan-
sion upon some of his assertions, this Essay will elucidate the no-
tion of race as a social construct and address some of the implica-
tions this realization has for understanding and addressing issues
of racism. Part I discusses the multiplicity of truth and argues
that the attempt to understand race through so-called objective
scientific analysis is a categorical error. Part II presents the dis-
tinction between race as a noun and race as a verb and describes
the socially constructed nature of race in United States society.
Part III discusses how the recognition that race is a social con-
struct affects and informs efforts to address racism in our society.
Ultimately, this essay concludes that understanding race as a so-
cial truth is useful for current efforts to eradicate racial inequality
in spite of the fact that it raises important questions regarding the
function of race in a just society.
I. The Multiplicity of Truth
The scientists' dilemma referenced by Omi is not surprising
when we contrast prevailing notions of race with the role race
plays in our everyday lives. Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence,
for example, has adopted a color-blind imperative for evaluating
race-based legislation and actions. 4 The Court attempts to justify
4. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1899 (1996) (striking down racially
motivated gerrymandering in Texas as unconstitutional); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct.
1894, 1951 (1996) (holding that the creation of two North Carolina congressional
districts based predominantly on racial classifications violates the Equal Protec-
tion Clause); City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989) (invalidating a
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this legal analysis with the conventional wisdom that race is re-
ducible to physical characteristics, 5 characteristics which ought to
have no bearing upon official decisions. Regardless of how we feel
about race as a physical reality, race plays an undeniably central
role in our everyday understanding of and interaction with one
another. The organization and structure of our social world make
it clear that race orders and affects our real-life experiences, and
to this extent race is far from reducible to mere physical features.
This seemingly self-contradictory nature of race disappears
when we recognize the difference between scientific truth and ex-
periential truth.6 As David Abram has pointed out, the Western
liberal tradition's attempt to understand and order the world
through objective criteria and classifications fails to grasp the mul-
tiplicity of truth:
[T]hese sciences consistently overlook our ordinary, everyday
experience of the world around us.... The everyday world...
is hardly the mathematically determined "object" toward
which the sciences direct themselves. Despite all the me-
chanical artifacts that now surround us, the world in which
we find ourselves before we set out to calculate and measure it
is not an inert or mechanical object but a living field, an open
and dynamic landscape subject to its own moods and meta-
morphoses.7
plan encouraging the use of minority businesses as an unconstitutional race-based
classification).
This color-blind imperative is based on the flawed assumption that race
and racial categories are the major problem. Therefore, the apparent effort is to
make color irrelevant and to consider all racial recognitions suspect regardless of
their intent or effect. But color-blind theory as it is practiced in our society is a
form of racing that helps maintain and reinforce racial hierarchy. See infra notes
16-22 (discussing racing). Far from race neutral, color-blind theory further natu-
ralizes the norm of Whiteness and White privilege without reference to race. See
RUTH FRANKENBERG, WHITE WOMEN, RACE MATTERS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION
OF WHITENESS 142-49 (1993); Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1346 (1988); john a. powell, An Agenda for the Post-Civil
Rights Era, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 889, 892 (1995).
5. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring) ('The difficulty of
overcoming the effects of past discrimination is as nothing compared with the diffi-
culty of eradicating from our society the source of those effects, which is the ten-
dency-fatal to a Nation such as ours-to classify and judge men and women on
the basis of their country of origin or the color of their skin.") (emphasis added). By
equating the protected class of "race" with "the color of one's skin," Justice Scalia
ignores the social aspects of race and has reduced race to a physical characteristic,
skin color.
6. There are differences in truth not only between science and experience, but
also within various paradigms of ordering science and experience. See generally
KUHN, supra note 3 (discussing how individuals see different things in the same
set of facts based on their relative paradigms).
7. DAVID ABRAM, THE SPELL OF THE SENSUOUS: PERCEPTION AND LANGUAGE
IN A MORE-THAN-HUMAN WORLD 32 (1996).
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It is this metamorphic realm of everyday experience in which
race primarily operates. Thus, attempts to establish and define
the total reality or unreality of race via quantitative scientific
analysis will necessarily fail-race is an experiential truth and it is
a categorical error to attempt to reduce the meanings and func-
tions of race to scientifically verifiable measurements. Although
not susceptible to quantified measurement, race nevertheless
shapes our social world in the same real way that experience
shapes our perceptions of self and reality.8 Once we understand
the multiplicitous nature of truth, it becomes clear that the asser-
tion that race is irrelevant because of its weak scientific basis is
false.
Moreover, not only is truth multiplicitous, it is also relative.
Because we perceive through a lens that is shaped by our individ-
ual and collective experiences, the science of humans is necessarily
subjective; we can only understand "objects" to the extent that
they are the "subjects" of our perception. Abram notes:
[T]he scientist never completely succeeds in making himself
into a pure spectator of the world, for he cannot cease to live
in the world as a human among other humans .... and his
scientific concepts and theories necessarily borrow aspects of
their character and texture from his untheorized, spontane-
ously lived experience. 9
While one may argue that the role of subjective experience
may be minimized in the context of measuring and understanding
physical phenomena (e.g., the weight of an atom or the relation-
ships between force, mass and acceleration), its role looms large in
our attempts to understand those things, such as race, which are
inextricably entwined with experience and which defy efforts at
quantification. Increasingly, scientists recognize both this percep-
tion problem, which lies inside as well as outside of science, and
post-modernism's assertion that reality is subjective.' 0 With re-
spect to race, however, much of popular discourse has failed to ap-
prehend this shift in scientific reasoning, and notions of scientific
certainty continue to be used to draw inappropriate conclusions
8. The claim that there is no objective scientific basis for race can also be
made regarding the self. Yet, as Katherine Ewing notes, the concept of a unitary
self remains an important fiction. Katherine P. Ewing, The Illusion of Wholeness:
Culture, Self, and the Experience of Inconsistency, 18 ETHOS 251, 258 (1990); see
also THOMAS H. OGDEN, THE SuBJEcTS OF ANALYSIS 25 (1994) (describing the "self
as a theoretical construct" that is "indispensable in the description of aspects of the
phenomenology of subjectivity").
9. ABRAM, supra note 7, at 33.
10. See generally KUHN supra note 3 (presenting and discussing the concept of
a reality which is defined by and through different paradigms).
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about race in the social and political sphere." This is particularly
problematic because the experiential and subjective realities of
race have deep implications for efforts to understand race and ra-
cism in our society. Conversely, failing to recognize that race is a
function, that "racing" is something we do to one another, 12 em-
powers uninformed, popular racial discourses by causing them to
seem natural, or at least accurate. 13
It must be emphasized that once we accept that race is a
subjective reality, it does not follow that its significance exists
solely on an individual and attitudinal level. Race is an example of
what Abram describes as "intersubjective phenomena-phenomena
experienced by a multiplicity of sensing subjects." 14 Although we
all have somewhat unique understandings of race, its collective
significance causes race to function in ways that have profound
structural significance for our society. Our understanding of race
is influenced by our subjective perception of it, but we do not have
the ability to de-signify race by our own volition. The reality and
meaning of race are "buttressed by many involvements besides
[our] own."'15 Unlike a daydream, for example, which consists en-
tirely of individual experiencing, race functions in collective ways
that are not alterable solely through individual will.
II. Race as a Social Construct: The Verb "To Race"
Realizing that race is not simply an objective scientific truth,
we must define race in a manner that accounts for its socially con-
structed, mutable nature. Michael Omi and Howard Winant have
11. Through the lens of scientific analysis, race constitutes nothing more than
skin color and perhaps a few other physical characteristics. See generally RICHARD
J. HERNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS
STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994) (providing a stark example of the use of race
and genetics to draw conclusions about intelligence and capability).
This scientific reality of race is commonly used to assert the irrelevance of
race and the injustice of race remediation programs. See, e.g., Greg Lucas and
Edward W. Lempinen, State GOP Pulls King Ad But Not Blitz: Party Still Will
Spend Millions to Push Prop. 209, S.F. CHRON. Oct. 25, 1996, at A21 (describing
the colorblind theorist practice of using Martin Luther King, Jr.'s I Have a Dreamn
speech as a way of equating with its quantifiable aspects, i.e., skin color, and using
that as the basis for asserting the unfairness of racial preferences).
12. For a more complete explanation of racing, see infra notes 16-22 and ac-
companying text.
13. See Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transformation, 143
U. PA. L. REV. 1659, 1661 (1995) ("Race derives much of its power from seeming to
be a natural or biological phenomenon, or at the very least, a coherent social cate-
gory.").
14. ABRAM, supra note 7, at 38.
15. Id.
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referred to race as "a concept which signifies and symbolizes social
conflicts and interests by referring to different types of human
bodies."'16 Similarly, David Theo Goldberg defines race as "the
various designations of group differentiation invoked in the name
of race throughout modernity."' 7
Both of these definitions provide key insights into the nature
of race. These insights can be captured by understanding that
race operates as a verb before it assumes significance as a noun. 18
Before someone can be said to possess a racial characteristic or
identity, there must first be a process of "racing" in which the at-
tributes that differentiate racial classifications are designated and
signified. Goldberg notes that "the concept of race enters Euro-
pean social consciousness more or less explicitly in the fifteenth
century" despite the fact that Europeans had already had repeated
contact with many of the groups that were to later be
"racialized."19
Racing is largely a top-down process where the more powerful
group first denudes the racial Other of its self-definition. This is
often done by denying the racial Other its language and culture
and then assigning a set of characteristics to this group that are
beneath those of the more powerful group.2 0 The dominant group
16. MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S, 55 (2d ed. 1994) (emphasis omitted).
17. DAVID THEO GOLDBERG, RACIST CULTURE: POLITICS AND THE POLITICS OF
MEANING 2 (1993).
18. Kendall Thomas has also made this insight in his work in critical race the-
ory. See, e.g., Kendall Thomas, The Eclipse of Reason: A Rhetorical Reading of
Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1805, 1806-07 (1993) C[WMe are 'raced'
through a constellation of practices that construct and control racial subjectivi-
ties.").
19. Id. at 21 (emphasis omitted).
20. See THEODORE W. ALLEN, THE INVENTION OF THE WHITE RACE, VOLUME
ONE: RACIAL OPPRESSION AND SOCIAL CONTROL 31-38 (1994); DAVID ROEDIGER,
TOWARDS THE ABOLITION OF WHITENESS 13 (1994). The dominant group is never
completely dominant. The racial Other will try to resist the negation of its own
self-definition and redefine some of the assigned traits and characteristics in a
more favorable manner. There is ongoing contestation in the racing process. As
Allen observes, "[t]he social death of the subjugated people is followed by social
resurrection in new forms from which they take up the task of overthrowing racial
oppression." ALLEN, supra, at 35. This social death is not always complete, and
different groups are raced to different degrees depending upon such dynamics as
power and the resolve of the racing group.
Because power is always fractured, there will be efforts (sometimes successful)
to race the more dominant group. This work may be carried out by "race traitors,"
those interested in identifying and destabilizing the invisible privilege of the
dominant group. See BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 46
(1984); Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of
Coming to See Correspondences Through Work in Women's Studies, in RACE,
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becomes the invisible norm by which all others are unfavorably
measured. Omi and Winant refer to this racialization process as
"racial formation," the "sociohistorical process by which racial
categories are created, inhabited, transformed and destroyed."
21
Because of its socially-constructed nature, the meaning attributed
to a racially identified group or characteristic is contingent upon
the socio-historical context in which the racing process occurs.
Thus racial meaning varies across time and space: who is White,
for example, and the implications of this signification differ across
and within societies and historical periods.22
Racialization in the United States
The shifting concepts of race in the history of the United
States demonstrate the socially constructed nature of race and its
socio-historical contingency. Despite its varying manifestations,
however, the role or function of race in the United States has re-
mained relatively constant. Groups of people have been "raced" as
a mechanism for implementing and justifying domination and
subjugation. The defining of racial categories in our society has
concurred with the distribution of the right to participate in the
body politic and access opportunity structures. Racial minorities
have simultaneously been defined as the racial Other and denied
the benefits of membership in American society. This concurrent
racing and excluding has caused the adverse effects of exclusion to
manifest along racial lines so that the White majority is then able
to use these effects to justify the original definition and exclu-
sion.23 Thus, the history of America is replete with what Omi and
CLASS, AND GENDER: AN ANTHOLOGY 70, 81 (Margaret L. Andersen & Patricia Hill
Collins eds., 1992); TONI MORRISON, PLAYING IN THE DARK: WHITENESS AND THE
LITERARY IMAGINATION 6-9 (1992); David W. Stowe, Uncolored People, LINGUA
FRANCA, Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 68, 74-75.
21. OMI & WINANT, supra note 16, at 55.
22. This insight applies not only to race, but also to gender, the self and even
God. The way that we perceive all of these concepts is specific to the social and
historical contexts in which we are situated. Late modern and postmodern think-
ers usually argue that everything is socially constructed. See, e.g., McIntosh, su-
pro note 20, at 77 (discussing the role of social creation in White and male privi-
lege); see also infra note 84 and accompanying text. The problem with race, then,
is not that it is socially constructed, but rather how and why it has been socially
constructed.
23. Goldberg recognizes the insidious use of this inverted logic in popular ex-
planations of racialized space in metropolitan America: "The poverty of the inner
city infrastructure provides a racial sign of complex social disorders, of their mani-
festation when in fact it is their cause.... [Ildeahzed racial typifications [are] tied
to notions of slumliness, physical and ideological pollution of the body politic, sani-
tation and health syndromes, lawlessness, addiction, and prostitution."
GOLDBERG, supra note 17, at 197-98; see also DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND
1997]
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Winant refer to as "racial projects": "simultaneously an interpreta-
tion, representation, or explanation of racial dynamics, and an ef-
fort to reorganize and redistribute resources along particular ra-
cial lines."24
An examination of the evolution of racial categories in the
United States, and the significance attributed to these categories,
demonstrates that race has primarily been a tool for maintaining
White, European privilege. As Neil Gotanda points out, racial
categories in colonial America prior to the establishment of the
United States were largely derived from one's labor status.25
Whereas status was originally categorized as free and unfree, or as
English and un-English,2 6 "[a]s slavery became entrenched as the
primary source of agricultural labor, slaveholders developed a
complementary ideological structure of racial categories that
served to legitimate slavery."27
Racial categories that seem natural and immutable today
have actually evolved historically as various groups vied for inclu-
sion in American society. A statement made by Benjamin Frank-
lin while advocating for the continued racial purity of America ex-
emplifies this seeming immutability:
[T]he Number of purely white People in the World is propor-
tionally very small. All Africa is black or tawny. Asia chiefly
tawny. America (exclusive of the new Comers) wholly so. And
in Europe, the Spaniards, Italians, French, Russians and
Swedes, are generally of what we call a swarthy Complexion;
as are the Germans also, the Saxons only excepted, who with
the English, make the principle Body of White People on the
Face of the Earth.
28
AMERICAN LAW 806 (1992) ("If proponents of black rights point to the pressing need
for more job opportunities for minority workers, the response is often that 'your
people have no skills, no educational background, no experience."'); John 0. Cal-
more, Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation: "Hewing a Stone of Hope
from a Mountain of Despair," 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1233, 1246-50 (1995) (discussing
the racialization of the "undeserving poor," that is, those persons society views as
somehow responsible for their poverty); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., How Race and Pov-
erty Intersect to Prevent Integration: Destabilizing Race as a Vehicle to Integrate
Neighborhoods, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1595, 1601-02, 1602 n.19 (1995) (discussing how
exclusion-driven poverty among Blacks perpetuates negative stereotypes); Ma-
honey, supra note 13, at 1661 ('[T]he construction of race in America today allows
whiteness to remain a dominant background norm, associated with positive quali-
ties, for white people and it allows unemployment and underemployment to seem
like natural features of black communities.").
24. OMI & WINANT, supra note 16, at 56 (emphasis omitted).
25. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of"Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 32 (1991).
26. Id. at 33.
27. Id.
28. BELL, supra note 23, at 29 (citing Staughton Lynd, Slavery and the Found-
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This statement is shocking, not only because Franklin was known
as an ardent abolitionist, 29 but because it shows that many people
who seem self-evidently White today have not always been viewed
as such.
The metamorphic development of racial categories is more
than just a curious historical footnote because who is considered
White in America has always signified who is entitled to privilege.
In this sense, the phrase "White privilege" is a redundancy-as
David Roediger and others have pointed out, Whiteness has al-
ways signified worthiness, inclusion and acceptance. 30 The Su-
preme Court exemplified this principle in 1923 when it construed
the Naturalization Act of 1790 in United States v. Bhagat Singh
Thind.3 The Naturalization Act specified that only "free white
persons" were eligible for citizenship and the benefits that accrued
with it.32 Thind, an Asian Indian who was categorized as White
(Caucasian) by contemporary ethnology, applied for citizenship
and was declared ineligible by the Court.33
In order to deny the privileges of citizenship to Thind, the
Court construed Whiteness as encompassing the understanding of
the "common man" who knew that Asian Indians were not really
White; i.e., they were not functionally White, even though they
may have been formally White. 34 The Court went on to reconcile
its reliance on common understandings with the fact that prevail-
ing notions of Whiteness had changed between 1790 and 1923 to
include Eastern and Southern Europeans. 35 According to the
ing Fathers, in BLACK HISTORY 130 (M. Drimmer ed., 1968)).
29. See id. (noting that Franklin was at one time the president of the Pennsyl-
vania Abolition Society).
30. See ROEDIGER, supra note 20, at 181-94. This assertion is verified by the
law's treatment of Whiteness as an actual property right from which benefits ac-
crued: "[I]n any mixed community, the reputation of belonging to the dominant
race, in this instance the white race, is property, in the same sense that a right of
action, or of inheritance, is property." Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 549
(1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also Cheryl
I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1758-59 (1993)
(discussing the "material significa[nce]" of Whiteness).
31. 261 U.S. 204 (1923).
32. Id. at 207. This Act was passed only a few months after the ratification of
the Constitution, and every naturalization act from 1790 until 1952 included
similar language restricting citizenship to Whites. IAN F. HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE BY
LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 42-43 (1996).
33. Thind, 261 U.S. at 215.
34. Id. at 209; see also ROEDIGER, supra note 20, at 182 ("[Thind] marked the
culmination of a process by which the legal system . . . 'rejected science, history,
legal precedent and logic to put the Constitution at the disposal of a legal fiction
called "the common man' -- an invented figure who knew that Asian Indians were
not white").
35. Thind, 261 U.S. at 213-14.
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Court, these groups came to be considered White because, despite
their "dark-eyed, swarthy" complexions, they "were received as
unquestionably akin to those already here and readily amalga-
mated with them."3 6  In other words, the Court conceded that
common understandings of Whiteness are predicated upon com-
mon acceptance, or rejection, of demographic groups. Ironically, in
the years following this decision, sixty-five Asian Indians had their
citizenship revoked as their imposed racial identity shifted from
White to non-White, and thus from American to non-American. 37
Another stark example of the manner in which racing is an
ongoing process that changes racial categorization in order to en-
sure the proper distribution of privilege is the rule of hypodescent,
whereby any fraction of "Black blood" renders an individual
Black.38 This method of classification was "the law's legitimation
of the use of Blackwomen's bodies as a means of increasing prop-
erty."39 In other words, this rule was adopted because it allowed
White slaveholders to increase the number of slaves they owned
regardless of the patrilineage of newborn slaves. The fact that
formerly the common law presumption was that a child's status
was determined by the status of the father demonstrates that ra-
cial categories have constantly shifted in American society in order
to maintain domination and enhance privilege. 40
The rule of the hypodescent led to the almost absurd case of
Susie Guillory Phipps, referenced by Michael Omi, in which a
forty-three-year-old functionally White woman sued the state of
Louisiana when she discovered that she was formally Black.41
Comparing the cases of Thind and Phipps, we find an emphasis on
domination that alternatively uses formal (hypodescent) or func-
tional (the "common man's" understanding) classifications for dis-
tributing Whiteness.
36. Id. at 213.
37. ROEDIGER, supra note 20, at 182. Irish Catholics also found themselves, for
a while, to occupy a position of ambiguous racial status. Id. at 184. During the
period of rapid immigration in the mid-nineteenth century, the Irish were por-
trayed as "simian" and "savage," and there was speculation of Black ancestry in
Irish blood. Id. What has distinguished the experience of Blacks from the Irish
and Asian Indian (as well as Jews and Southern and Eastern Europeans), how-
ever, has been the persistence of their Other status, and the persistence of their
exclusion from full societal participation. As Roediger notes, "[t]he duration of
'not-yet-whiteness' [for these groups], as measured against that of racial oppres-
sion in the U.S., was quite short." Id. at 185.
38. Omi, supra note 1, at 8.
39. Harris, supra note 30, at 1719 (footnote omitted).
40. Id.
41. Omi, supra note 1, at 7-10.
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Just as the ways in which groups have been raced have mu-
tated in order to enforce the White dominance imperative, so have
the justifications supporting these identifications shifted in order
to reconcile continued White domination with democratic egali-
tarianism. Initial efforts to justify slavery focused on religion and
biology. The domination and exploitation of Blacks were justified
on the ground that Blacks were heathens and less than human.
42
As the sciences of eugenics and craniology have become discred-
ited, however, the continued reconciliation of White privilege with
democracy has taken different forms.
In our current era of de facto segregation and discrimination
where White domination survives without the need for overt racial
discrimination, Blacks' inferior social, economic and political
status is justified by their supposed "culture of poverty."43 Under
this rubric, individual minorities congregate at the bottom of the
social ladder not because of group-based discrimination or struc-
tural racism, but because they have each internalized cultural ten-
ets which conflict with the societal norms of hard work and law-
fulness that enable individuals to succeed in our society.44 This
dialogical shift away from overt racism demonstrates how the
White dominance imperative "assumes transforming specificity
and legitimacy by taking on as its own the connotations of pre-
vailing scientific and social discourses."45 In other words, as ex-
plicitly racist discourse has been discredited, a new discourse con-
sistent with conventional understandings of race has emerged to
maintain White supremacy. Many of the race-neutral terms that
are popular in today's discourse have overtly racist historical un-
derpinnings and practical racial implications. For example, terms
like "individualism," "working class" and "equal opportunity" all
hearken back to explicitly racist exclusionary practices. 46
42. See Harris, supra note 30. at 1716-21. "[A]s the system of chattel slavery
came under fire, it was rationalized by an ideology of race that [by regarding
Blacks as heathen and savage] further differentiated between white and Black."
Id. at 1717 n.25.
43. Calmore, supra note 23, at 1243-44.
44. As Calmore notes, this explanation is appealing to conservatives because it
adopts their emphasis on individual autonomy. Id. at 1248-50. This focus ab-
solves those who have "succeeded" in society of responsibility for those who have
"failed" by severing any causal connection between successful Whites and unsuc-
cessful Blacks.
45. GOLDBERG, supra note 17, at 4.
46. For a discussion of how the working class was racialized from the begin-
ning to mean White, see DAVID ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND
THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS 19-21 (1991); see also GOLDBERG,
supra note 17, at 16-20, 44, 113-14 (discussing the racist origins of the concepts of
"individualism" and "equal opportunity").
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The European definition and exaltation of the individual
were adopted in part to distinguish White Europeans from African,
Indian and other non-White peoples that organized their society
around non-individualistic norms.47 The construction of the indi-
vidual, then, was neither natural nor race neutral, but was part of
the racing process. Similarly, the concept of equal opportunity was
used early in the Enlightenment project to mean that people had
an equal opportunity (i.e., freedom) to become Christian-to ad-
here to the divine law of Christianity-and in doing so, gain inclu-
sion into the polity.4s  Those who chose to reject Christianity-
Muslims, pagans, and so on-violated this universal morality and
were not deserving of inclusion. Again, we find an unquestioned,
seemingly universal norm grounded in culturally specific norms
that further the racializing process.
Today, instead of referring to minorities as inherently infe-
rior and undeserving, we now define the undeserving poor (i.e., the
underclass), by characteristics that are race-neutral in theory, but
heavily racialized in practice. 49 As John Calmore notes, the traits
that separate the deserving from the undeserving--criminal pro-
pensity, welfare dependency, employment status, etc.-are traits
that are heavily racialized in our popular discourse.50 Thus, when
Ronald Reagan condemns the "Chicago welfare queen" as a socie-
tal pariah and George Bush uses Willie Horton to represent the
depraved criminal,5 ' it is no coincidence that the images evoked
are simultaneously abhorrent and Black.52
47. GOLDBERG, supra note 17, at 44.
48. Id. at 16-17.
49. Conservative Charles Murray makes this deserving/undeserving dichotomy
explicit:
I am referring symptomatically to the fellow who is not just temporarily
unemployed, but can't manage to hold a job for more than a few days at a
time, no matter what. I'm not referring to the woman who is without a
husband and trying to raise a child on her own, but to the woman who is
chronically dependent on welfare and also doesn't really pay a lot of atten-
tion to her child and doesn't pay a lot of attention to the people around her
as neighbours.
Michael Keith & Malcolm Cross, Racism and the Postinodern City, in RACISM, THE
CITY AND THE STATE 1, 12 (Malcolm Cross & Michael Keith eds., 1993) (quoting
radio broadcasts in the summer of 1990 by Charles Murray).
50. Calmore, supra note 23, at 1247.
51. KENNETH O'REILLY, NIXON'S PIANO: PRESIDENTS AND RACIAL POLITICS
FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 360, 381-88 (1995)
52. As is the case with explicitly racist discourses, our current implicit racist
discourse persists despite its failure to accurately describe reality. Thus Blacks, as
well as other minority groups, are largely perceived as poor, criminal, unemployed,
etc., despite the fact that, for example, in 1991 67.3% of Blacks did not live in pov-
erty. Calmore, supra note 23, at 1247. To a certain extent, our implicit racist dis-
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Segregation's racialization of space is a primary vehicle in
maintaining the viability of this contemporary racial discourse.
Martha Mahoney refers to segregation as "the product of notions of
black inferiority and white superiority, manifested geographically
through the exclusion of blacks from more privileged white neigh-
borhoods and the concentration of blacks into subordinated neigh-
borhoods stigmatized by both race and poverty."53 The intersection
of racial, social and economic isolation that segregation creates in
America's central cities legitimizes culture of poverty theories by
creating a location simultaneously identified by concentrations of
minorities; social ills such as crime and welfare dependency; and
economic deprivation as manifested by poverty, joblessness and
structural deterioration. 54
What is ignored in this cultural analysis of the inner city,
however, is the explicit role that the White majority and the gov-
ernment itself have played in creating and maintaining this ra-
cialized space, in creating a society where good neighborhoods are
defined as White neighborhoods and in defining positive individual
characteristics as White characteristics. White flight, the process
whereby Whites abandoned central cities for the suburbs (and
whereby metropolitan space became racially defined along the
suburb-central city line), has been fueled by racist fears and facili-
tated by a host of government policies ranging from home mort-
gage financing55 to highway and infrastructure construction. 56
course has mutated to accommodate such inconsistencies. Thus, popular discourse
draws a distinction between Blacks in general and "middle class Blacks," and be-
tween Whites in general and "poor White trash." Middle class Blacks are per-
ceived as somehow transcending Blackness by virtue of their socio-economic ad-
vances, and poor Whites are perceived as somehow less than White because of
their failure to live up to the economic and cultural norms for Whiteness.
53. Mahoney, supra note 13, at 1659.
54. See infra notes 100-06 and accompanying text (highlighting the interre-
lated nature of racial subordination and "opportunity-enhancing indices"). This
confluence of forces has led to a situation where, as of 1980, the ghetto poor was
65% Black, 22% Hispanic and only 13% Non-Hispanic White and other races. Paul
A. Jargowsky & Mary Jo Bane, Ghetto Poverty in the United States, 1970-1980, in
THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 235, 252 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds.,
1991).
55. The federal government established the Home Owners Loan Corporation
(HOLC) in 1933 to refinance mortgages and provide low-interest loans to home
owners victimized by the Great Depression. Michael H. Schill & Susan M. Wa-
chter, The Spatial Bias of Federal Housing Law and Policy: Concentrated Poverty
in Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1285, 1308 (1995). The Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) was established in 1934 with the aim of guaranteeing home
loan mortgages. As of 1972, the FHA had insured 11 million home mortgage pur-
chase loans and 22 million home improvement loans. Id. at 1309.
56. As of 1994, the federal government alone had spent $123 billion on high-
way construction and billions more for infrastructure expansion and maintenance
for suburban areas. DENNIS JUDD & TODD SWANSTROM, CITY POLITICS: PRIVATE
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Furthermore, the Whiteness of this flight has been main-
tained by an endless array of tactics ranging from brutally violent
responses to integrative efforts 57 to government-led redlining58 and
exclusionary zoning.5 9 Thus our current racial discourse is pre-
served through the maintenance of racialized space as poor Blacks
are concentrated in easily identifiable central locations, whereas
poor Whites are dispersed among economically integrated White
neighborhoods. 60
III. Addressing Racism in Light of Race as a Social
Construct
As noted earlier, recognizing that race has no inherent
meaning or validity does not deprive it of relevance in our soci-
ety.6' Recognizing race as a social construct does, however, pro-
vide some insight into how to address racial issues. Because ob-
jects gain racial significance through social and historical
processes, it is clear that the significance of racial classifications is
neither given nor immutable. Racism necessarily carries with it a
negative implication about the racial Other. Race need not and of-
ten does not carry such a connotation. Although race and racism
are closely tied to each other historically, they are not coterminous.
POWER AND PUBLIC POLICY 180-81, 207-09, 392 (1994).
57. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 30 (1993) (describing commu-
nal riots in northern cities between 1900-1920 in the wake of massive black migra-
tion).
58. Both the FHA and HOLC adopted the practice of redlining in the admini-
stration of their loans, whereby uniform appraisal standards were adopted that
deemed integrated and predominately minority areas too risky for investment. Id.
at 51. These governmental practices in turn influenced and legitimated redlining
in the private lending industry and government officials were known to circulate
their redlined maps to private lenders. Id. at 52.
59. State governments have delegated their zoning power to individual mu-
nicipalities. In turn, these municipalities have exercised this zoning power to ex-
clude poor minorities from their suburbs by zoning in ways that preclude the de-
velopment of low- and moderate-income housing. Florence Wagman Roisman &
Philip Tegeler, Improving and Expanding Housing Opportunities for Poor People of
Color: Recent Developments in Federal and State Courts, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
312, 343 (1990).
60. As of 1980, 36% of poor Blacks lived in census tracts where 40% or more of
the population was in poverty and an additional 27% of poor Blacks lived in tracts
where 30-39% of the residents were in poverty. DAVID ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT
202 (1988). Conversely, only 8% of poor Whites lived in tracts where 40% or more
of the residents were in poverty and another 9% lived in tracts of 30-39% poverty.
Id.
61. One can question the importance of inherent meaning.' For example, al-
though many believe that the self lacks inherent meaning because its meaning is
generated by reference to, and interaction with, external phenomena, none would
suggest doing away with it.
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Even though the racing project defines race, the raced group may
appropriate and redefine terms as positive. For example, during
the 1960s African Americans took the label "Black" and tried to re-
cast it as a positive attribute. While the effort may not have been
completely successful, it did change the way African Americans
relate to the term.62 Thus, race can be a positive way in which
people organize their identity.
Although race continues to operate in complicated and multi-
plicitious ways in society, it is racism and not race that is the heart
of the problem. Efforts to address racism should therefore focus on
the manner in which racialization processes create and maintain
hierarchy, while seeking to destabilize and reverse them. In other
words, we need to focus on the processes by which White is defined
as good, hard-working and human, and by which Black is defined
as lazy, unemployed, criminal and less-than-human. Thus, our ef-
forts should be focused upon racing situations and mechanisms
such as those policies and practices which racialize metropolitan
space and distribute privilege accordingly.
Although focusing on racing and racial hierarchy rather than
on racial categories per se is a necessary approach, its conse-
quences are uncertain. The uncertainty of this process is only
made worse by the movement toward "e-racing" society.63 Indeed,
as mentioned earlier, e-racing, as practiced by most color-blind ad-
vocates, is another form of racing. It is not necessarily problematic
that groups identify and define themselves with racial categories. 64
Racing is problematic when it is imposed by others so that the
raced group is stripped of its self-identity, and re-defined by the
racer, but race itself does not entail subjugation. For example,
when a group uses race to challenge racial hierarchy and subjuga-
tion, racial evasion or color-blindness then becomes a tool by the
dominant to deny the challenging group an identity that might
destabilize racism. In this sense, racing involves both assigning
and depriving groups of racial identity.
62. OMI & WINANT, supra note 16, at 99-103.
63. Frankenberg refers to this color-blind impulse as "color evasiveness" or
power evasiveness," that is, the tendency of Whites, even when discussing race, to
avoid power and hierarchy. FRANKENBERG, supra note 4, at 52.
64. Race, unlike culture, always entails a relationship to others, but this is not
necessarily a dominant/dominated relationship. In the context of American race
relations, this relational necessity of race is evidenced by the fact that
"White/European self-constitution is ... fundamentally tied to the process of dis-
cursive production of others, rather than preexisting that process." Ruth Franken-
berg, Whiteness and Ainericanness: Examining Constructions of Race, Culture, and
Nation in White Women's Life Narratives, in RACE 62, 63 (Steven Gregory & Roger
Sanjek eds., 1994).
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Furthermore, much of what is considered racially neutral
from a color-blind perspective is merely Whiteness hiding behind
the transparency that its power gives it.65 What is called for then
is not the e-racing of society, but instead the elucidation and dest-
abilization of Whiteness. Thus, it is imperative that anti-racist ef-
forts focus on those aspects of race that are most problematic and
most abhorrent to our egalitarian ideals, namely racial domination
and privilege.
The Uncertainty of Abolishing Racial Categories
A logical response to the notion that race has been socially
constructed to create, maintain and justify White privilege is to
say that we can and ought to do away with racial categories alto-
gether. But, as suggested above, this response misunderstands
the relationship between racism and race on one hand and the
meaning of social construction on the other. While race undoubt-
edly continues to have meanings in our society, the relevant in-
quiries address how these meanings are obtained and what their
relationships are to racism. At any given moment race has a num-
ber of different meanings, and these meanings often interact with
each other in complex ways.66
This interconnected relationship only touches upon the com-
plexity of race. Race is not only an external trait that allows us to
categorize each other, it is also an internal process that implicates
our internal and external worlds. Even in our internal world race
is multiplicitous, unstable and subject to change.6 7 This is true
largely because the self, organized around concepts such as race,
gender and religion, is itself multiplicitous, dynamic and unsta-
ble.6 8 In addition, race is relational. How one experiences one's
racial self will vary depending on one's basis for comparison. Zora
Neale Hurston captures this idea by describing the day she
"became colored" the day she left her all-Black society for school:
"It seemed that I had suffered a sea of change. I was not Zora of
Orange County any more [sic], I was now a little colored girl."6 9
65. See id. (articulating a relationship between power and the social construc-
tions of race).
66. Neil Gotanda has identified some of the ways that race works across differ-
ent categories. See Gotanda, supra note 25, at 3-5 (identifying four distinct uses of
race in color-blind jurisprudence).
67. This insight was conveyed to me by Jonathan Levy, a former Jurispru-
dence student of mine who spoke of the tensions he experienced as an avowed anti-
racist permeated by the racism of our society.
68. See Ewing, supra note 8, at 258-59.
69. ZORA NEALE HURSTON, How It Feels to Be Colored Like Me, in I LOVE
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Even if we could eradicate racism in our society, it is not clear
that race would cease to have meaning. The historical persistence
of racism makes it difficult to envision a United States in which
race has no meaning. 70 Racial definitions are so inextricably
woven into the structure of our society that any efforts to eradicate
them require fundamental shifts in social conception and organiza-
tion. Goldberg notes that "[t]o change a discourse obviously re-
quires much more fundamental shifts, shifts in whole ways of
world making."71 Such a monumental reorientation is problematic
because it necessarily entails the reformulation of "widely held be-
liefs, beliefs which moreover are central to everyone's identity and
understanding of the social world."72
Regardless of the origins of racial classification in the United
States, racial definitions have taken various and changing, but
central, roles in individual and group conceptions of identity. By
its nature, identity needs to develop around things; there is no
identity qua identity. Although racialization has operated as a
mechanism of domination, notions of race as a social reality have
developed in manners and directions not conceived or encouraged
by the White majority. Thus, racial identification, although often
thrust upon racial minorities, has developed in numerous positive
directions. Gotanda refers to these positive aspects of racial iden-
tity as culture-race: the "broadly shared beliefs and social prac-
tices" that result from the common socio-historical experiences of a
racially defined group. 73 Any efforts to de-racialize society run the
risk of de-legitimizing culture-race and the identity of racialized
minorities.74
MYSELF WHEN I AM LAUGHING... AND THEN AGAIN WHEN I AM LOOKING MEAN
AND IMPRESSIVE 152 (Alice Walker ed., 1979).
70. Genevieve Lloyd addresses the analogous problem of trying to imagine a
world without sexism. See GENEVIEVE LLOYD, MAN OF REASON: "MALE" AND
"FEMALE" IN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 102-10 (1984) (discussing maleness as the his-
toric and all-pervasive indicator of what is valued in Western society and its im-
pact on femaleness).
71. GOLDBERG, supra note 17, at 10.
72. OMI & WINANT, supra note 16, at 55.
73. Gotanda, supra note 25, at 4.
74. This dilemma is an unavoidable result of the fact that, because race is a
socially constructed multiplicitous concept, efforts to address racism are compli-
cated by the myriad functions of race in our society. The manner in which race
operates in cultural spheres, for example, is related but not identical to the man-
ner in which race functions in spatial spheres. See, e.g., infra note 96 (discussing
the spatial impact of race upon personal mobility); infra note 99 (likening the cul-
tural role of the White perspective to that of a narrator invisibly guiding how the
audience perceives the course of events); infra note 103 (pointing to the spatial im-
pact of racial disparities in housing demographics); and infra notes 111-12 and ac-
companying text (discussing the direct cultural impact of race upon reputation and
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Attempts to de-racialize American society are also problem-
atic from a more pragmatic standpoint. Because racial projects
continue to structure and organize society, denial of racial rele-
vance without first addressing the structural centrality of race ac-
tually impedes efforts to address racial hierarchy. This dilemma is
evidenced by the effects of the current vogue, the neoconservative
theory of "color-blindness." Drawing upon race's lack of scientific
truth, advocates of color-blindness assert that race is a morally ir-
relevant category which ought to play no role in decision making
processes.7 5 Instead, the color-blind theory asserts that the as-
signment of privileges and benefits ought to be based on individual
merit as evidenced by indices such as education, performance on
standardized tests and other indicators of capability.
The current political landscape provides ample evidence of
how color-blind ideology is used to facilitate the continued subju-
gation of minorities and other traditionally excluded groups in the
name of neutrality. In California for example, opponents of af-
firmative action employed color-blind theory to support the Cali-
fornia Civil Rights Initiative (popularly known as "Proposition
209"), a constitutional amendment banning public-sector affirma-
tive action programs. 76 Similar notions of neutrality have been
employed in Colorado's use of "sexual orientation blindness" which
is little more than a thinly veiled attack on remedial programs
aimed at ending discrimination against homosexuals. 77 Indeed,
status).
75. GOLDBERG, supra note 17, at 7.
76. See Edward W. Lempinen, Confusion on Affirmative Action Ban: Voters
Seem Ambivalent Toward Ballot Initiative, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 22, 1996, at A17
(asserting that for some, affirmative action has "evolved into a tangled web of pref-
erences, a spoils system").
77. See Clarence Page, Anti-gay Law Flies in the Face of the 14th Amendment,
CHI. TRIB., Oct. 11, 1995, at 19 (describing the statements of the executive director
for the "Amendment 2' sponsoring group that claimed general support for "equal
rights" but characterized equal rights for gays and lesbians as "special rights"); see
also Jan Crawford Greenberg, Court to Review Gay Rights Laws: Justices to Decide
If Ballot Initiatives Deny Civil Liberties, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 22, 1995, at3 (discussing
opponents' framing of the amendment as one "prohibiting new laws giving prefer-
ences on the basis of sexual orientation"). The amendment provided:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or depart-
ments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or
school districts shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordi-
nance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, con-
duct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis
of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority
status, quota preferences, protected status or claim or discrimination.
Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1623 (1996) (discussing the origins and scope of
the amendment before invalidating it as a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause).
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despite proponents of color-blindness' call for fairness and justice,
one is hard pressed to find contemporary examples of color-
blindness or neutrality being invoked for the benefit of the subju-
gated groups.
By fixating on the formal classifications of race rather than
the functions of race, color-blind theorists fail to comprehend, or
choose to ignore, the fact that access to opportunities in our society
is very much conditioned on one's racial grouping.78 Thus, this de-
contextualized view of race portrays racial differences in the dis-
tribution of opportunities and benefits as either the aberrant re-
sult of irrational discriminatory individuals or as the result of
individual failure on the part of minorities. In doing so, this mode
of analysis actually serves the ends of racial domination because
de facto racial segregation, our racial history and hierarchy are ig-
nored, and race-based remedial efforts, such as affirmative action,
are considered to be as irrationally tainted as programs and prac-
tices that maintain White privilege. 79
By construing formal recognitions of race as inherently sus-
pect, color-blind theory also fails to consider positive aspects of ra-
cial identification. Shared socio-historical experience has led to
the development of rich cultural traditions within racially identi-
fied groups. Color-blind theory, combined with majoritarian poh-
tics, fails to recognize that in a democratic society, all groups
should have avenues for self-expression and all members of society
should be exposed to one another's views and experiences. Thus,
color-blind theory erroneously denounces the value of promoting
diversity in educational environments8 0 or giving minorities access
to broadcast licenses.8 '
By fixating on race as scientifically invalid without ques-
tioning race as an experiential truth, color-blindness also exalts
Whiteness to the level of a universal. It asserts that we live in a
de-raciahzed society despite the fact that societal norms and con-
cepts of Americanness have developed in almost exclusively White
78. See infra notes 100-06 and accompanying text
79. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995)
(holding that all racial classifications by government actors must be reviewed un-
der strict scrutiny, including affirmative action).
80. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944-48 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. de-
nied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996) (striking down the University of Texas School of Law's
affirmative action admissions program in spite of the school's assertion that it is
pursuing diversity in education).
81. See, e.g., Metro Broad. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that equal protection mandates that our government treat citi-
zens as individuals, not as components of classes).
1997]
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political, social and cultural spheres.82 Thus when people are as-
sessed according to so-called objective standards, they are in real-
ity assessed by standards of Whiteness. In fact, the whole notion
of addressing racism by de-racing or e-racing society, and instead
focusing on people as individuals, is very much a White concept. It
is the White Western liberal tradition which asserts that we are
fundamentally atomistic and individual, and that we gain identity
through ourselves. 83 This focus on the individual as the solution is
then just another form of assimilation whereby we are assessed by
the values of White culture, by our ability to achieve Whiteness.
Color-blind theory's failure to account for positive aspects of
race results from its erroneous assumption that race is the same as
racism. An equally flawed assumption of color-blind theory is that
if something is socially constructed it can simply be willed away.8 4
This fails to take seriously the postmodern claim that everything is
socially constructed, that there is no "new" fact yet to be discov-
ered.8 5 While one may challenge the enormity of this claim, even
the more modest assertion that much of what we take as fact de-
rives its meaning from our language and social structure is sober-
ing. If there is such a thing as scientific fact in opposition to social
fact, it may be that the social fact is able to make at least as strong
a claim on us because social truths have at least as much descrip-
tive validity for the individual as scientific truths.8 6 Although the
way we think about race and the self will change as a result of
psychological and cultural events, this change simply cannot be
willed into existence.
82. See infra note 97-99 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of
Americanness in terms of Whiteness).
83. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3-6 (1971) (discussing how the
concept of justice and the organization of society are developed through the inter-
actions of "individuals" and "persons").
84. As several commentators have emphasized, "socially constructed" means
"not individually constructed." See GOLDBERG, supra note 17, at 187-88; OMI &
WINANT, supra note 16, at 55.
85. See RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY 86 (1989)
(asserting that there is no context "that can do justice to all our opportunities of
insight and association"); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, PASSION: AN ESSAY ON
PERSONALITY 7 (1984) (arguing that societies are bound together by common vo-
cabularies and common hopes, not common philosophical principles).
86. See ABRAM, supra note 7, at 33 ("Even the most detached scientist must
begin and end her study in this indeterminate field of experience, where shifts of
climate or mood may alter his [sic] experiment or her interpretation of 'the data."');
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 31-32 (1984) (explaining
that there are no facts without theories).
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Problems with Retaining 'Positive' Aspects of Race
Although attempting to do away with race entirely is prob-
lematic and potentially counter-productive, 87 some also view as
problematic the fact that attempts to address racial hierarchy
must necessarily affect current racial definitions and the relevance
they hold for individual and collective identities.8 8 Because of the
centrality of race in ordering individual and collective experience,
destabilizing race must entail the destabilization of our entire sys-
tem of belief, a very uncertain and daunting task. This task is
nevertheless a necessary one given that racial identities are, to
some extent, products of common, racialized experiences, and thus
products of White racial projects. 89
The celebration of an identity that is significantly defined and
shaped by racist oppression without adopting, to some extent, the
terms of the oppressor is a difficult, if not impossible, enterprise. 90
Omi and Winant assert that contemporary America is a racial he-
gemony in which White privilege is maintained by a combination
of coercion and consent 9L-a consent obtained when the subject of
87. It is worth noting that whether color-blind advocates are sincerely inter-
ested in doing away with racial domination is highly debatable. In fact, many of
the staunch proponents of doing away with race have very weak anti-racist
stances. On the Supreme Court, for example, it is Justices Scalia and Thomas who
most forcefully assert the importance of color-blindness while continually electing
to uphold the interests of White supremacy. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 395-96 (1992) (reflecting Justice Scalia's invalidation of an ordinance
proscribing racist hate speech on the grounds that regulations of speech must be
content neutral and thus color-blind). See also supra note 4 and accompanying
text (discussing the significance of the color-blind imperative in recent Supreme
Court jurisprudence).
88. Gotanda presents this view when he asserts that, from a jurisprudential
standpoint, "[o]nly by treating culture-race as analytically distinct from other us-
ages of race can one begin to address the link between the cultural practices of
Blacks and the subordination of Blacks, elements that are, in fact, inseparable in
the lived experience of race." Gotanda, supra note 25, at 56.
89. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
90. Goldberg articulately addresses the tension implicit in deriving identity
from socially constructed Otherness:
[R]acial identity, even when externally ascribed, implies unity-at least
conceptually. When this identity is internalized it prompts identification,
a social sense of belonging together. It is then that racial differentiation
begins to define otherness, and discrimination against the racially defined
other becomes at once exclusion of the different. Since the seventeenth
century elaboration of racial differences and identities has served as a
leading mode of promoting exclusions and inclusions.
GOLDBERG, supra note 17, at 51-52 (footnote omitted) (emphasis omitted). As dis-
cussed earlier, current racial discourse continues to define and characterize Black-
ness and Whiteness in terms of inferiority and superiority. See supra notes 43-56
and accompanying text.
91. See OMI & WINANT, supra note 16, at 67 (defining hegemony as "the condi-
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racialization adopts and internalizes the terms of racialized iden-
tity.92 Although this adoption is never complete, and the terms of
racial discourse are often appropriated and transformed by the ra-
cialized Other, a failure to challenge the discourse itself enables
this hegemony to persist. To effectively address racial hierarchy
and domination, we must address racing as a hierarchical process
despite the implications this has for racial identities and cultures.
The task of racial transformation and its effects warrant less
cause for concern when we consider that ideas of race and racial-
ized culture have shifted in the past and will continually shift in
the future.93 To treat Black culture, for example, as a static con-
cept is to ignore the fact that race and culture, as social constructs,
are in states of constant flux. Because there is no inherent essence
to these notions-that is, because the notions of race and racialized
culture are inextricably linked to socio-historical context-their
meanings will necessarily change as the myriad contingencies of
their existence change. Our goal in addressing racism, therefore,
must be racial transformation focused on the number of different
ways that race is used within specific contexts to create and main-
tain White privilege. By addressing how race functions to domi-
nate, we will transform racial meanings without necessarily de-
stroying racial identity. The result of this effort is uncertain, but
no more uncertain than the future in general.
Addressing Whiteness as Privilege
The hazard of obsolescing minority cultures in an attempt to
create an egalitarian society is not one that merits serious atten-
tion. Racing is so pervasive in the construction of our society that
it is difficult to conceive of a time when notions of race will cease to
have meaning. Rather than paralyze ourselves by attempting to
understand or predict that which is uncertain, we instead need to
focus our efforts upon addressing what it is about racing and racial
discourse that most violates the ideals to which we aspire-namely
race's function to dominate. I contend that, because privilege and
exclusion have been structured around racially identified groups,
we need to focus our efforts on understanding and challenging
Whiteness as privilege.
tions necessary, in a given society, for the achievement and consolidation of rule,"
and extending and applying the concept to racial rule).
92. See id.
93. See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text (discussing the process of
racing and its relation to the creation of racial meaning over time).
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Addressing racial hierarchy by focusing on Whiteness is a pe-
culiar proposition in our society.94 Although the negative implica-
tion of minority exclusion is majority inclusion, most people speak
of racism in terms of the burdens that it places upon minorities,
without recognizing the benefit it confers on Whites.95 In fact,
conventional wisdom seems to ignore that Whites and minorities
both occupy racial categories, instead assuming that only minori-
ties have a racial identity. Whiteness takes on the property of in-
visibility in the everyday experiences of Whites.96 This is under-
standable given that throughout American history minorities have
been excluded from those political, social and cultural institutions
that define what is American. Consequently, American identity is
defined as White, 97 and Whiteness is "a dominant background
norm"98 used to examine without being examined itself.99 This in-
94. It is an approach, however, that has become increasingly prominent in the
recent past. See ALLEN, supra note 20, at 27-28; FRANKENBERG, supra note 4, at
138; HANEY LOPEZ, supra note 32, at 22; JANE LAZARRE, BEYOND THE WHITENESS
OF WHITENESS (1996). The projects of these writers suggest that Whiteness may
be losing it invisibility. They also indicate that as the critical race-making eye is
turned toward Whites, Whites themselves may be the object of some racing.
95. A frequent occurrence of this characterization of racism as minority exclu-
sion rather than majority inclusion in the use of the phrase "blacks are less likely
than whites" to receive a particular social or economic benefit, rather than "whites
are more likely than blacks." See, e.g., Blacks Found Less Likely Than Whites to
Be Promoted in the Military, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1995, at A20 ("[B]Ilacks are less
likely to be promoted than their white counterparts").
96. Peggy McIntosh has described White privilege as "an invisible weightless
knapsack of special provisions, assurances, tools, maps, guides, codebooks, pass-
ports, visas, clothes, compass, emergency gear, and blank checks." McIntosh, su-
pra note 20, at 71.
97. See OMI & WINANT, supra note 16, at 66.
98. Mahoney, supra note 13, at 1661.
99. The invisibility of Whiteness in a White-dominated culture is similar to the
invisible presence of the narrator in a story told from the third person point of
view. The ever present subject (i.e., racer or author) has the power to name and
define the object without ever calling explicit attention to his or her presence or
perspective. Thus, this perspective becomes the unexamined discourse or frame-
work by which objects are described and defined. See JOHN BERGER, WAYS OF
SEEING 10 (1972) (making a similar observation with respect to photography)
"Every image embodies a way of seeing. Even a photograph. For photographs are
not, as often assumed, a mechanical record. Every time we look at a photograph,
we are aware, however slightly, of the photographer selecting that sight from an
infinity of other possible sights." Id.
Trinh T. Minh-ha has noted that how the Other, in this case the female writer,
is colonized, and thus defined, when forced to use language that has developed
within her male-dominated society:
She-her has always conveyed the idea of a personal and gender-specific
voice. In order to be taken more seriously, she is therefore bound to dye
this voice universal, a tint that can only be obtained through words like
man, mankind, he-him.... Such a convenient way to generalize and to
transcend the sex line. One must practice to forget oneself, she said.
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visibility enables Whites to simultaneously recognize that minori-
ties have been denied opportunities and resources, and assert that
Whites have achieved their own societal status through personal
merit. By failing to critically examine their identity and their
status, Whites fail to comprehend that the denial of opportunities
for minorities has led to increased access to these opportunities for
the majority.
The privilege of Whiteness, however, is plainly visible to the
critical eye. Whites, historically and contemporarily, have had and
continue to have access to resources and other opportunity-
creating structures at levels unknown to most minority groups.
Comparing Black and White demographics for opportunity-
enhancing indices, such as wealth, 100 homeownership, 10 1 income 0 2
and residential location 03 reveals sharp disparities. Moreover,
these disparities are the direct result of racial subordination and
discrimination, 104 and have a mutually reinforcing and perpetuat-
TRINH T. MINH-HA, WOMAN, NATIVE, OTHER: WRITING, POSTCOLONIALITY AND
FEMINISM 27 (1989). Similarly, Frantz Fanon has noted how the colonial and non-
colonial powers define Blacks as the objective Other. FRANTZ FANON, THE
WRETCHED OF THE EARTH 250 (1963) (referring to colonialism as the "systematic
negation of the other person and a furious determination to deny the other person
all attributes of humanity").
100. The net worth of Blacks, measured in terms of home equity and financial
assets, is on average $43,143 less than that of Whites. MELVIN L. OLIVER &
THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTHIWHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON
RACIAL INEQUALITY 8 (1995).
101. In 1989, 69.4% of White households owned their own homes as opposed to
43% of Black households. Wilhemina A. Leigh, Home Ownership and Access to
Credit 11 (Dec. 3, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Institute on Race
and Poverty, University of Minnesota Law School).
102. In 1984, 31% of Black families lived in poverty compared to 11% of White
families and per capita Black family real income was only 57% of that for Whites.
Norman Krumholz, The Kerner Commission Twenty Years Later in THE ME-
TROPOLIS IN BLACK AND WHITE: PLACE, POWER AND POLARIZATION 31 (George C.
Galster & Edward W. Hill, eds., 1992).
103. Seventy-eight percent of the U.S. population resides in metropolitan areas
with 67.8% of African American metropolitan residents living in central cities as
opposed to 33% of White metropolitan residents. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
CURRENT POPULATION REP. SERIES P-60, No. 175, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES:
1990, at 77 (1990).
104. For example, the federal government's mortgage lending programs (the
Home Owners Loan Corporation and the Fair Housing Administration) systemati-
cally redlined minority and racially mixed neighborhoods and refused to guarantee
home mortgage loans within them. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text
(discussing redlining and other White majority practices creating racialized space).
The effect of redlining was to direct opportunities for home ownership to Whites
and to the suburbs. See id. Private lending discrimination is also prevalent as is
demonstrated by the fact that Blacks and Latinos are two to three times as likely
to be rejected for mortgage loans as Whites. ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL.,
MORTGAGE LENDING IN BOSTON: INTERPRETING HMDA DATA 1 (Fed. Reserve Bank
of Boston Working Paper No. 92-7, 1992).
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ing nature. 10 5 Thus, in our era of de facto racism, the ends of
White domination are achievable without the previously necessary
means of overt, de jure discrimination.10 6
Cheryl Harris, among others, has insightfully observed that
White privilege is akin to a property interest. 10 7 She asserts that:
property is a legal construct by which selected private inter-
ests are protected and upheld....
... When the law recognizes, either implicitly or explicitly, the
settled expectations of whites built on the privileges and bene-
fits produced by white supremacy, it acknowledges and rein-
forces a property interest in whiteness that reproduces Black
subordination. 108
The characteristic of Whiteness thereby becomes a sort of
reputational interest by which individuals are deemed to be de-
serving of certain opportunities and benefits. 0 9 This reputational
interest in turn shapes individual identity and an individual's
sense of worth and entitlement."10 The societally accepted value of
Whiteness is evidenced by the fact that, until the mid-twentieth
century, calling a White person Black was considered defamation:
depriving a person of their Whiteness was depriving them of a le-
gally protected interest in their reputation and status."' Not sur-
prisingly, the laws did not recognize any harm in calling a Black
person White." 2
105. One's location within a metropolitan area determines access to job oppor-
tunities (most of which occur in the suburbs), educational systems, loans (central
city neighborhoods are devalued and considered risky for home and business
loans), and so on. See john a. powell, How Government Tax and Housing Policies
Have Racially Segregated America, in TAXING AMERICA 80, 80 (Karen B. Brown &
Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996). Income and wealth, determined by job status
and access to lending institutions largely determine one's ability to choose residen-
tial location within metropolitan areas as suburban municipalities engage in ex-
clusionary zoning practices that prohibit the development of low- and moderate-
income housing. Id.
106. It is this recognition that makes the intentions of color-blind theorists so
suspect and the effects of color-blind ideology so insidious.
107. See Harris, supra note 30, at 1714-15. See also ROEDIGER, supra note 20,
at 181-94 (describing how various immigrants came to be viewed as White and
consequently gained the right to naturalize, participate in popular politics and join
the mainstream workforce); ALLEN, supra note 20, at 185 (noting that, for immi-
grants, Whiteness in America meant that "however lowly their social status might
otherwise be they were endowed with all the immunities, rights and privileges of
'American whites").
108. Harris, supra note 30, at 1730-31.
109. See id. at 1734.
110. Cf. id. at 1735-36 (discussing the manifestations of "[p]rivate identity based
on racial hierarchy").
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1736. Harris tells the story of her light-skinned grandmother who
1997]
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Accepting Whiteness as the American norm without ad-
dressing the underlying privilege that has conferred this status
upon it is particularly problematic given our tradition of Western
liberal thought. This tradition is premised on the notion of nature
and experience as orderable and objectively knowable. When we
deny the fact that individual experience is necessarily filtered
through the subjective lens of perception, the power to define
"objective" truth resides with those whose perceptions are valued
and validated. Thus, in our society, the subjectivity of White
Europeans, shaped by their perceptions, culture, norms, ideology,
etc., has been exalted as objective and they have been empowered
to determine what is normal and natural. Attempting to address
racial hierarchy without addressing this backdrop of Whiteness
achieves the "assimilationist ideal" while devaluing the positive
aspects of race.118 Minority groups gain a semblance of equality,
but on conditions that are predetermined by White majority soci-
ety, and without a critical evaluation of what aspects of Whiteness
are shaped by historical and contemporary racism. Furthermore,
failing to address the privilege that has shaped Whites' settled ex-
pectations creates a sense of meritocracy in which the congestion
of Whites in the upper ranks of society is seen as the result of indi-
vidual effort and just deserts.
One example of how to address Whiteness and destabilize
current racial discourse is by addressing metropolitan segregation.
Segregation's racialization of space races individuals by defining
Blackness as inner city, unemployed, criminal, etc., and defining
Whiteness as suburban, employed, law-abiding, educated, etc. Ad-
dressing this racial discourse requires, as Martha Mahoney notes,
"changing widespread patterns of residence and economic devel-
opment and changing the social meanings attached to these pat-
terns."114
Conclusion
Michael Omi's revelations regarding the incongruity of racial
classifications in America provide useful insight and raise some
very critical issues for those committed to pursuing racial democ-
racy. Recognizing that race is a social construct is instructive for
efforts to address racism. At the same time it serves as a reminder
was able to "pass" as White, and in doing so gain employment at a department
store that excluded Blacks. Id. at 1710-12. This story demonstrates that calling a
Black person White was more a conveyance of a property interest than a removal
of one.
113. Gotanda, supra note 25, at 56.
114. Mahoney, supra note 13, at 1663.
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of the complex and entrenched nature of the problems that we are
confronting. If we are to use this recognition to our benefit, it is
clear that we must not only deconstruct what it means for minori-
ties to be racialized, but also what it means for Whites to be ra-
cialized. The exclusion of minorities, contemporarily and histori-
cally, from access to opportunities necessarily implies the over-
inclusion of Whites and until we begin to address this basic truism,
racial hierarchy will persist.

